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ABSTRACT
The internet provides an ever-expanding, valuable resource for entertainment, communication, and 
commerce. However, this comes with the simultaneous advancement and sophistication of cyber-attacks, 
which have serious implications on both a personal and commercial level, as well as within the criminal 
justice system. Psychologically, such attacks offer an intriguing, under-exploited arena for the understand-
ing of the decision-making processes leading to online fraud victimisation. In this chapter, the authors 
focus on approaches taken to understand response behaviour surrounding phishing emails. The chapter 
outlines how approaches from industry and academic research might work together to more effectively 
understand and potentially tackle the persistent threat of email fraud. In doing this, the authors address 
alternative methodological approaches taken to understand susceptibility, key insights drawn from each, 
how useful these are in working towards preventative security measures, and the usability of each ap-
proach. It is hoped that these can contribute to collaborative solutions.
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the rate of malicious emails being sent to users was at its highest in five years. For example, in 
relation to one specific type of phishing, approximately 1 in every 131 emails contains malware (Verizon, 
2017). Despite efforts from experts in the field, email fraud remains one of the most pertinent cyber 
security threats. The persistence of this threat indicates a need for reconsideration of mitigation methods 
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in place to protect against this, as those currently employed do not seem to be sufficient to counteract 
it. In line with this, there is also a need to consider the effectiveness of methods used within a research 
setting to improve our understanding of how users become victims to social engineering attacks, such as 
phishing emails. It is crucial that there is an alignment between the theoretical knowledge base gained 
through academic research, and the practical role this has in industry efforts to tackle email fraud.
Research across multiple disciplines has considered how best to address the threat posed by social 
engineering attacks. Computer science research is often concerned with systems-based approaches to 
managing fraud through the use of detection algorithms (Islam & Abawajy, 2013; Salah, Alcarez Calero, 
Zeadally, Al-Mulla, & Alzaabi, 2013) or automated heuristic filters, which detect machine learned 
patterns (Abu-Nimeh, Nappa, Wang, & Nair, 2007; Garera, Provos, Chew, & Rubin, 2007) to prevent 
emails from reaching the user. However, simultaneous advancement in the techniques employed by the 
fraudster means that these solutions are short-lived, as a work around is often found within a short space 
of time to circumvent such detection algorithms. In addition to this, these machine learning approaches 
tend to focus more on the detection of generic phishing emails, with detectable anomalies to legitimate 
email traffic. They may be less suited to the detection of more sophisticated attacks that either employ 
a hacked account, or are more personalised to appear believable. In these cases, the attacker is targeting 
what is often considered the systems’ weakest link – the human user (Barrett, 2003; Mitnick & Simon, 
2002; Schneier, 2000).
As the ‘weakest link’ in cyber security, the human user and the decision-making processes they employ 
in email management must be understood in order to address the threat and reduce system vulnerability. 
Contributions from psychology have considered how various factors can affect email response behaviour, 
from individual differences amongst users, to the context in which a specific email is read. Unfortunately, 
such findings are constrained by limitations in conducting fundamental cyber security research from 
both a practical and an ethical perspective. On the other hand, industry experts in cyber security conduct 
training exercises and vulnerability tests within organisations without the same constraints that feature 
within academic research. This chapter will outline how the approaches taken in academia and industry 
to understand and address issues relating to email decision-making can complement one another. In doing 
this, the authors aim to highlight the importance of unity between these two approaches, emphasising 
the need for continued collaboration in future research in order to maximise the effectiveness of efforts 
made to tackle the persistent threat of email fraud.
EMAIL FRAUD TYPOLOGY
As most internet users will be aware, phishing emails come in all shapes and sizes, covering an array of 
subjects from sale of Viagra pills to urgent account updates. As such, providing a specific definition of 
phishing is not straightforward, although one useful example comes from Myers (2007):
Phishing: A form of social engineering in which an attacker, also known as a phisher, attempts to 
fraudulently retrieve legitimate users’ confidential or sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic com-
munications from a trustworthy or public organisation in an automated fashion. (p. 1)
Across the wide array of fraudulent emails in circulation, there are a number of factors that allow 
for a broad categorisation. Three main types of phishing emails that commonly exist will be outlined. 
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These are often successful in deceiving thousands of users. A series of specific real world examples will 
then be outlined to demonstrate how these different approaches and techniques might be incorporated 
in genuine phishing attacks.
1.  Deceptive Emails: In the most generic sense, deceptive emails are distributed to thousands of users 
in an attempt to gather confidential information. This vast distribution only require a small response 
rate to be economically worthwhile for the fraudster. These emails usually attempt to solicit account 
information, passwords, or install malicious software. Most often, users are required to download 
a file, or click a link embedded within the email. Following a link may then ask them to input their 
login details to a fake website, purporting to come from a genuine organisation. Additional per-
suasive tactics may be employed in these emails, such as a sense of urgency, leading users to panic 
about losing access to accounts if they do not act. Empirical evidence demonstrates the impact of 
time pressure on decision-making, as discussed in more detail below, emphasising the impact that 
this type of persuasive approach can have on a user.
2.  Spear Phishing: As opposed to the generic phishing emails that are distributed to many users, spear 
phishing is a sophisticated social engineering technique that targets an attack towards a specific 
user or group of users. By accessing information about the recipient from social media and public 
web pages, or with access to insider knowledge, these emails incorporate personal or particularly 
relevant information, in order to make an attack more believable.
3.  Whaling: One specific type of spear phishing attack involves imitation of a senior executive of a 
company, known as whaling. This acts as a way of convincing an employee to respond and act in a 
way that benefits the fraudster. For example, they may be asked to transfer money to a fraudulent 
account, under the premise of a legitimate business transaction. This approach is typically conducted 
by gaining access to the executive’s account to send the email, or through the use of a convincingly 
similar domain name to that of the company being targeted. The specificity of information incor-
porated into these emails means users often overlook the minor details that indicate the fraudulent 
nature of the message.
REAL WORLD CASE STUDIES
Media reports of cyber security attacks are becoming more frequent, as they increase in scale and so-
phistication. Particular attention is drawn to attacks on large corporations that hold confidential data 
on thousands, or even millions, of members of the public as customers. The high profile individuals 
whose response decisions allow access to this data are often scrutinised, in particular when there is 
substantial financial loss as a result of the attack. Such cases demonstrate the extent of risk associated 
with user response to email fraud, and also the diversity in approaches taken by the fraudsters to target 
these organisations.
In late 2013, US store Target was the victim of a substantial data breach, with credit card information 
for around 110 million customers stolen (Peterson, 2014), and it all began with a malware infected phish-
ing email (Picchi, 2014). By targeting a heating and air conditioning firm that were subcontracted by 
Target, the fraudsters were able to obtain network credentials and access confidential sales and customer 
data. Although the financial impact of this case has not been reported, it demonstrates the vulnerability 
of companies who have a strong obligation to protect confidential customer information.
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During the US election campaign in late 2016, thousands of emails from the personal account of 
John Podesta, campaign chairman for Hilary Clinton, began appearing on the whistle-blowing website 
WikiLeaks (Smith, 2016). These shed light on relationships and disputes between party members, as 
well as campaign strategies. As the story evolved, it became apparent that these emails were accessed 
following a phishing attack purporting to be from Google, which Podesta had responded to even after 
seeking advice from colleagues about its legitimacy. The email inferred unauthorised access to the ac-
count and provided a link for Podesta to change his password in order to ensure security. The success 
of this attack demonstrates the potential impact of response not only on the user, but also in this case on 
the integrity of an entire political campaign.
In early 2017, reports hit the headlines of two US companies being victims of a phishing attack that 
led to over $100 million being transferred to the fraudster over a two-year period (Yuhas, 2017). By 
posing as an employee of a manufacturing company in Asia that regularly conducted business with the 
companies, the fraudster convinced employees to set up numerous multi-million dollar transactions. It 
was later announced that Google and Facebook were the victimised companies (Roberts, 2017), two of 
the world’s biggest technology companies. This targeted attack, using a deceptive cover and mirroring 
transactions that employees were familiar with organising, demonstrates the level of sophistication that 
can be achieved.
The case studies outlined here give an insight into the different types and variations on phishing 
emails, from generic password changes to sophisticated social engineering attacks. These also highlight 
the differing impacts that these can have on the victim or organisation, from confidential data breaches 
to extensive financial loss.
BEHAVIOURAL EXAMINATIONS OF SUSCEPTIBILITY IN INDUSTRY
The case studies highlighted above give only a brief snapshot of the degree to which organisations across 
a range of industry sectors can demonstrate vulnerability to email fraud, with varying magnitude. As such, 
many organisations acknowledge that there is a need to address cyber security concerns. It is becoming 
more common for companies to employ cyber security experts to conduct vulnerability testing, and the 
need for this is increased by the introduction of new regulations on data privacy, such as the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation. It is possible that this shift in attitude towards engaging with additional 
security measures may be due to compliance with legislation, rather than a deeper understanding of the 
risks faced, but regardless it shows a step in the right direction towards addressing ongoing cyber security 
threats. In this section, the authors will outline the approaches commonly used in an industry setting to 
assess vulnerability to email fraud, and consider how these can benefit organisations, whilst going on 
to consider how they may be enhanced by integration with theoretical insights from academic research.
Methods
When engaging cyber security experts to mitigate risk, there are three common routes an organisation 
can take. On the most basic level, some organisations opt for a vulnerability test, which provides a ba-
sic overview of the weaknesses within a system, based on data from an automated scan that picks up 
common errors and configuration mistakes (Yeo, 2013). This type of testing does not allow experts to 
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examine the data that they could potentially obtain through these vulnerabilities. Instead, it highlights 
surface-level issues, such as missing security patches, that can be fixed promptly and without occupy-
ing the time of company employees. It also does not take into account the vulnerability that can result 
from employee behaviour online.
In addition to this, many organisations employ a penetration testing team to demonstrate the scale 
of the vulnerability. This allows information to be gathered about whether they are able to infiltrate the 
organisation’s network and systems, and what extent of data they are able to attain. This can involve: 
an attack on the physical network, to assess whether the devices used by employees can be hacked; at-
tempts to bypass the security solutions that the organisation currently has in place, such as firewalls; 
and assessment of the effectiveness of attacks targeted at employees of the company, through user-based 
vulnerability testing, which will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
One major concern in employing external penetration testers, also known as ethical hackers, is their 
trustworthiness. The organisation is, in a sense, encouraging these experts to hijack their systems, and 
as a result giving them access to potentially confidential data. A penetration test can either be conducted 
externally, testing how easily an organisation can be hacked from outside the network, or internally to 
assess the risk associated with insider attacks. An organisation must have faith that these ethical hackers 
will not become malicious, taking advantage of an organisation at its most vulnerable for personal gain. 
The need for this kind of security testing may outweigh the potential cost, and an organisation often has 
no choice but to trust the ethical hackers (Duke, 2002).
The nature of a penetration test is dependent on the specific needs of an organisation, who will high-
light their main concerns to the testers and allow them to conduct simulated attacks as appropriate. For 
organisations that are concerned with the risk posed by employee behaviour, a penetration test might 
involve a behavioural assessment through administration of a simulated phishing attack, designed for 
the purpose of the investigation. The employees who receive the phishing email are kept unaware of the 
vulnerability testing being conducted, in order to provide a realistic assessment of response behaviour. 
The rate of response to the simulated attack informs the organisation of the level of risk faced as a result 
of human decision-making. However, penetration testing only captures the level of vulnerability within an 
organisation at the given point in time when an attack is simulated. In reality, the level of vulnerability is 
likely to vary with contextual and organisational changes within the organisation, but multiple simulated 
attacks across different contexts would be time consuming and may raise suspicion with employees, 
impairing the validity of the assessment.
In contrast, a comprehensive cyber risk assessment goes a long way to overcome this issue of con-
text, by considering the specific assets that leave an organisation most vulnerable, the likelihood of an 
attack on these occurring, the impact that could come from this, and the risk management strategies that 
would be most effective in addressing it (NIST, 2012). Whilst this type of assessment often incorporates 
vulnerability and penetration testing, it will also go beyond these to explore the risks posed by associated 
organisations, and shared data networks. In addition, the risk management strategies that result from 
such an assessment are continually monitored and updated in line with the transient nature of threats 
faced by the company, and the varying levels of vulnerability encountered.
These three approaches offer differing, but complimentary, methods for understanding the extent of 
an organisation’s vulnerability. Each has an alternative outcome measure, and as such the decision about 
which to employ is dependent upon the needs of a specific organisation. The key insights that can be 
attained through the use of such techniques are outlined in more detail below.
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Key Insights and Usability
In relation specifically to assessing vulnerability to phishing emails, the use of actual simulated attacks, 
in which the recipients are unaware of the artificial nature of the email received, means a naturalistic 
assessment of susceptibility in the work place can be achieved. Simulated phishing attacks as part of a 
penetration test usually require specific hypotheses that shape the email stimuli, have certain success 
criterion that demonstrate vulnerability within employees, and require use of a method that can be rep-
licated in future assessments (Barrett, 2003). The rigour involved in the design and implementation of 
such a test is akin to an empirical experiment carried out as part of an academic research project. Unlike 
a research study though, there are fewer limitations on the methods used in order to simulate an attack, 
“the imagination of the social engineer is the only limit to the types of approaches that they can present 
and exploit” (Barrett, 2003). These tests demonstrate to organisations that the behaviour of employees 
can put their organisation at risk during an attack, which often results in additional training on how to 
detect phishing attacks and reduce vulnerability if an actual attack were to happen.
However, some have argued that there are limitations to the techniques involved with simulated at-
tacks, as well as more broadly with penetration testing, which impair the usefulness of this technique in 
reducing future user vulnerability within an organisation. It has been noted by experts in the field that 
the lack of continuity or common taxonomy in the type of simulations conducted (Hudic, et al., 2013) 
makes replication and comparison of results across organisations difficult, in particular where tailored 
social engineering attacks are implemented (Barrett, 2003). As mentioned above though, the specific 
risks faced by an organisation vary dependent on their assets, and also across different contexts. As such, 
a simulated attack requires an element of tailoring (that has the down side of making it non-replicable) 
in order to give a valid assessment of vulnerability. It is therefore important to consider the balance of 
assessment rigour and validity in relation to the specific organisation, in order to optimise the impact 
and utility of this technique.
As an assessment of an organisation’s vulnerability to targeted social engineering attacks, penetra-
tion tests are limited by an ethical responsibility to avoid infiltration of third party systems and linked 
organisations (Barrett, 2003). In this sense, the test may underestimate vulnerability, given the magni-
tude of additional information that could be gathered from these external sources in order to generate 
or target an attack that affects the organisation itself. As demonstrated in the earlier Target case study, 
access to confidential data was breached as a result of someone in a third party organisation with close 
ties to Target, responding to an email attack. By considering the hypothetical scenarios in which third 
party organisations might increase vulnerability, a cyber risk assessment also describes the additional 
risks associated with shared access to confidential data and information systems. This is typically ac-
counted for in the development of a risk mitigation strategy that includes monitoring of changes in who 
has access to data, and addresses the threat associated with this.
Whilst these methods provide a valuable assessment of vulnerability within a naturalistic environ-
ment, and in many cases incorporate actual response behaviour through simulated attacks, they provide 
little insight into the underlying behavioural processes that influence employee behaviour. In relation to 
penetration testing, this means that there is no assessment of the context in which an email is received 
and read, which may have an impact on the response decision, as shown in academic research, discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. Whilst risk assessments are designed to consider a broader range of 
vulnerabilities within the organisation, they still lack the depth to understand why some employees may 
be more susceptible to attack than others. In cases where individual employees are recognised for their 
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demonstration of vulnerability during a simulated attack, this can lead to disciplinary actions (Barrett, 
2003) rather than attempts to understand and modify behaviour. Where training is invoked upon employ-
ees, this can range from warnings and response instructions, to more informative educational and support 
programmes. The former has limited success in reducing response behaviour though (Junger, Montoya, 
& Overink, 2017), whilst the latter is less common due to time constraints and cost of implementation. 
Instead of encouraging secure behaviour in the future, the use of simulated phishing attacks and training 
may have an unforeseen effect of employee disgruntlement with the process (Murdoch & Sasse, 2017).
By conducting simulated attacks in the work place, there is an overarching ethical concern that these 
are in some ways designed to ‘catch out’ employees. The discontent that results from this means that 
employees may not acknowledge the benefits that could be elicited through more secure behaviour in 
the future. Compliance in general is a concern, in relation to risk mitigation strategies that come from 
a cyber risk assessment also. It is therefore important to consider how such risk mitigation strategies 
might be informed by our understanding of human behaviour and decision-making processes to better 
understand both vulnerability, and behaviour change around security protocols. Rather than seeking to 
punish and patronise employees, this understanding would allow effective user-centric security solu-
tions. This is where insights from academic research might be able to better inform the development 
of security initiatives taken within industry organisations, in an effort to enhance effective response 
behaviour surrounding cyber threats.
BEHAVIOURAL EXAMINATIONS OF SUSCEPTIBILITY IN RESEARCH
Psychological approaches from academic research offer an alternative perspective to cyber security 
behaviour, by attempting to understand the underlying mechanisms that influence behaviour. Focusing 
on the decisions made by human users, such research has attempted to understand why certain users 
demonstrate a higher level of susceptibility to email fraud. Reports suggest a fraudulent email response 
rate of approximately 5% (Norton, 2014), meaning that 95% of users who receive the same email do not 
respond. This may be because some did not see the email, some may have deleted it without reading it, 
but a large proportion are likely to have read (at least some of) the email and made an explicit decision not 
to respond. This might be because it was not relevant to them, or because they recognised its fraudulent 
nature. In all cases, the processes underlying such decisions offer an interesting set of clues that may be 
eventually help optimise secure online behaviour (Fischer, Lee, & Evans, 2013).
Most research studies are conducted within a controlled environment, allowing the researcher to 
manipulate various aspects of the stimuli and context in which this is viewed, to understand specific 
behaviours. However, this also means that the naturalistic assessment of susceptibility is jeopardised in 
many cases. It is therefore important, for this emerging field of psychology, to understand how this level 
of experimental control affects decision-making behaviour, and consider ways to enhance the validity 
of research, whilst maintaining ethical integrity.
Methods
Whilst approaches from industry are most often concerned with the immediate and applied need to man-
age organisational risk by reducing employee vulnerability, academic research places greater emphasis on 
identifying conceptual relationships between variables, testing and validating theories of causal processes. 
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Research has adopted a variety of approaches to assess human behaviour surrounding phishing emails, 
which perhaps contributes to the lack of consistency. In terms of behavioural assessments of suscepti-
bility, methods have ranged from explicit legitimacy judgments of email stimulus, to simulated attacks 
whereby participants have given consent to an alternative research study. The use of explicit judgment 
tasks allows for control of situational influences on response behaviour, such as time pressure (Yan & 
Gozu, 2010; Jones, Towse, Race, & Harrison, submitted), whilst simulated emails provide a more realistic 
measure that still allows for some level of control over the stimulus that participants are responding to.
In an explicit judgment task, participants are typically asked to make a decision about the legitimacy 
of a series of email stimulus, or asked how they would respond to each of these. Yan and Gozu (2012) 
showed participants a set of 36 emails, all of which were genuine phishing emails, and asked them whether 
they would ‘read’ or ‘delete’ each of these. In this particular task, results may be limited by the use of 
phishing emails only, meaning that participants who were looking to differentiate between phishing 
and legitimate emails may have demonstrated an expectancy bias. Alternative versions of this type of 
task have incorporated a mixture of phishing and legitimate emails (Jones, et al., submitted; Nicholson, 
Coventry, & Briggs, 2017), allowing for a more representative example of what a participant might see 
in their own inbox. However, such methodologies are still limited by the explicit nature of the legitimacy 
judgments, which does not reflect the complexity of the decision-making process that likely occurs in 
real life. Instead, participants are encouraged to engage in certain behaviours, such as employing more 
rational decision-making strategies, which results in an artificially high accurate response rate to the 
email stimulus (Yan & Gozu, 2012; Harrison, Vishwanath, & Rao, 2016).
Alternative approaches to the use of explicit judgment tasks have incorporated a role-play element, 
whereby participants are asked to interact with and manage the inbox of a fictional employee, and report 
how they would respond to a series of emails (e.g. Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007; Hong et al., 2013). 
This variation on the task allows for an assessment of how users interact with an actual inbox, without 
being alerted to the nature of the task. However, it is possible that the nature of the task itself, asking 
participants to make response decisions to a set of emails, may alert them to the purpose of the research. 
This being said, Parsons et al. (2013) demonstrated that participants showed higher accuracy in a role-
play scenario like this when they were aware of the nature of the task, compared to participants who 
were only told the purpose of the study after completing that task. This difference in response behaviour 
suggests that the naïve participants were not alerted to the purpose of the study whilst completing it. This 
study raises an important point about the accuracy of response rates seen in lab-based studies of email 
behaviour though, demonstrating that making explicit judgments may elicit an artificially low level of 
susceptibility. However, there is little evidence to indicate how this artificial response behaviour relates 
to real world susceptibility.
An additional limitation to such lab-based assessments of response behaviour is the lack of conse-
quence associated with responding, in comparison to real life. When responding through a simulated 
account, the participant has nothing to lose in choosing to respond or not respond. This is in contrast 
to a genuine attack within industry, where an error in judgment can lead to data leaks, espionage, and 
financial loss. Within the lab environment on the other hand, participants may receive a reward for ac-
curate responses, but the consequences for inaccurate responses do not equate. As it stands, lab-based 
studies provide an ethically sound alternative to simulated attacks, but with potentially limited validity.
One way of addressing the uncertainty in the validity of judgment tasks as a measure of susceptibil-
ity is to consider working with past victims of email fraud (e.g. Button, Nicholls, Kerr, & Owen, 2014; 
Modic & Lea, 2011; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). Typically, this research is conducted in a qualitative 
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capacity, gathering insights into the decision-making processes that led to victimisation. This methodol-
ogy provides a sample that has self-evidently demonstrated susceptibility to email fraud. However, such 
opportunities come with a cost - in terms of the inability to retrospectively capture the psychological 
influences of this susceptibility, specifically the relevant contextual influences at the time of the attack. 
This is reliant on the recall of the participant about the exact scenario and external factors that were in 
place at the time they received and responded to the email. Dependent on the period of time that has 
passed since the incident, this can prove difficult. Additional assessments of a participant’s cognitive 
make-up may have changed as a result of the incident, making them less representative of the individual 
differences between users at the point when they became a victim. Finally, this methodology is reliant 
on the availability of a sample of past victims, as well as a comparable control group who have not dem-
onstrated susceptibility. Ideally this control group will have been recipients of similar incoming emails 
as the victim, but this is very difficult to control for and unrealistic as a method for precisely comparing 
response behaviour between the two groups. In line with this approach, research has also analysed the 
content of genuine past phishing emails, to establish linguistic patterns and persuasion techniques that 
may encourage a response from the recipient (e.g. Freiermuth, 2011).
Some researchers have employed simulated phishing attacks as an assessment of susceptibility, in 
a manner comparable with penetration testing in industry assessments. These clearly provide the most 
ecologically valid behavioural assessment, but are also the most ethically challenging, in that recipients 
may feel upset or angered at being ‘tricked’ into responding, without having given consent prior to the 
attack. Unlike industry penetration testing, simulations as part of academic research are designed to as-
sess the influence of specific factors, rather than a baseline measure of vulnerability. In order to do this, 
stimuli may be designed in a specific way to emulate persuasive techniques that might be employed in a 
phishing email, such as authority (Guéguen & Jacob, 2002) or familiarity (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, 
& Menczer, 2005). Alternatively, these may include additional measures to assess influences such as 
security knowledge (Wright & Marett, 2010).
As with industry penetration testing, one major limitation of these simulated attacks is the inability to 
control or monitor the context in which an email is received. This means that little insight can be gained, 
directly, about the situational factors influencing response behaviour, as this is reliant on the recall of 
the user themselves. It also becomes difficult to assess how the effect of different persuasive techniques 
varies between users, as sending a multitude of target messages, which assess each of these, to the 
same person may raise suspicion. On the other hand, if a single target email is sent, sample sizes would 
need to be large enough to account for individual differences between users. This type of methodology 
requires some further development in order to address these issues and provide a useful assessment of 
response behaviour.
In order to demonstrate how experimental design and consent issues may interact with the potential 
validity of a research study, it is worth describing an undergraduate student research project from our 
lab (Mack, 2014). One of the project objectives was to empirically study the consequences of informed 
consent about a phishing attack. The project, which had been approved by the institutional ethics com-
mittee as well as the institutional network support team, involved a modest sample size (N=30). Half the 
participants signed up to a study titled “Reasoning and judgements made in an online capacity”. These 
individuals provided informed consent to take part in the study, and as such, they were informed that 
they would be sent simulated phishing emails in the subsequent 7 days. The other participants signed 
up for a study, “A study of human-computer interaction”. They were sent the same simulated phishing 
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emails, but prior to the study slot they signed up for, which was actually used to inform them of the study 
purpose and to then seek post-event consent for their involvement in the study.
Participants received two different emails from two bespoke email accounts created for study pur-
poses with the knowledge of the institutional IT services. These emails came from “Lancaster” accounts 
(where the study was conducted), adopting a phisher’s “spoofing” attack vector, and the sender was 
unfamiliar to participants. One email carried a warning message (account verification) and the other a 
competition incentive (win an iPad!). Both emails requested a reply response, though at that stage no 
confidential information was requested or retained. Later, only participants (both responders and non-
responders) who agreed to have their data retained were retained in the study (although as it happened, 
no-one withdrew). The study showed that for those participants who provided informed consent, 40% 
showed some vulnerability in responding to one of the two phishing emails, whilst no-one responded to 
both. For those participants who had no prior warning via informed consent, 80% responded to at least 
one phishing email, and 20% responded to both. As well as revealing the extent of users’ susceptibility 
to attack, these data suggests a dependency between the form of consent and response patterns. In other 
words, standard experimental design issues such as obtaining prior informed consent can have a mate-
rial impact on how users will behave. This is in line with research from Parsons et al. (2013), reported 
above, which demonstrated similar effects as a result of gaining informed consent from participants for 
a role play study. Using an alternative research study as a mechanism for gaining partial consent is a 
concept supported by Resnik and Finn (2017). However, rather than opting in to participate, they argue 
that participants should be given the opportunity to opt-out of a study on email behaviour, avoiding a 
sample bias towards those who are more security conscious. Combined with privacy protection and 
appropriate debriefing, Resnik and Finn believe that simulated attacks can be conducted in an ethical 
manner, allowing for valuable data to be gathered.
Many ethical review boards are still reluctant to approve a simulated phishing attack without informed 
consent from the participant though, given the principle that participants should be fully informed before 
willingly volunteering to participate in research. Studies of this type also require the cooperation of relevant 
IT support, who need to be aware of the study and how to appropriately handle queries from individuals. 
It may be argued that seeking post-consent leads participants to feel under pressure to comply, given that 
the data has already been collected and it would otherwise be wasted. On the other hand, the study by 
Mack (2014) suggests that obtaining prior consent could compromise the integrity of a study. Although 
the evidence on the effect of priming is inconsistent to date, one alternative solution to the consent issue 
is to gain informed consent for a simulated phishing attack that will happen at some point in the future. 
With enough time between sign-up and the event, the effects of pre-warning may have dissipated, and 
thus the response behaviour elicited provides more naturalistic data. However, the authors are not aware 
of research that can pinpoint the delay period required for such a procedure to “work”.
There have been a small number of studies that have used simulated attacks where the participants 
are naïve to the purpose of the study. Jagatic et al.’s (2005) study incorporated a simulation of a targeted 
phishing attack, using information gained about participants online without their consent. Following 
this study, Finn and Jakobsson (2007) reported that 30 out of the 1700 participants targeted complained 
about the research, with 7 asking for their data to be withdrawn. Although this is a small proportion of 
the overall sample size, disgruntlement amongst any number of participants is of concern to researchers 
ethically. A further example, although indirectly related, comes from a study conducted by Facebook, 
in which they manipulated newsfeed content to see if they could affect user’s emotions in their own 
posts (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014). Although there is a clause in the Terms and Conditions of 
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having a Facebook account that legally allows this type of research, the organisation received extensive 
backlash from users and industry experts for the lack of informed consent (Arthur, 2014). If we wish to 
understand and model real-world fraud events, we need to consider how on-going genuine research and 
ethical issues can be accommodated without distorting the integrity of the study itself.
Key Insights and Usability
As mentioned above, the focus of academic research into susceptibility to phishing varies in terms of 
its aims and the theoretical implications of these, and as such the methodologies adopted vary as well. 
Most prominently, research considers three potential sources of influence – the content and persuasive 
techniques employed within the email itself, contextual factors at the time the email is received, and 
individual differences between the users who are receiving the email (see Jones, Towse, & Race, 2015, 
for a comprehensive overview).
It is becoming more common for sophisticated phishing emails to be targeted towards a specific 
recipient or group of recipients, in order to make the email more believable and thus increase response 
likelihood. This is a process that can be automated, with data gathered across a number of online sources 
to maximise the plausibility of the attack (Edwards, Larson, Green, Rashid, & Baron, 2017). Jagatic et al. 
(2005) used publicly available information from social media to develop emails that purported to come 
from someone known to the recipient and found an increased response rate to these, demonstrating the 
influence of familiarity and social compliance on response likelihood. Research into the link between 
social media usage and cyber crime victimisation (through phishing, as well as other attack methods), 
has demonstrated though that specific types of social networking sites are more likely to increase vic-
timisation. Specifically, knowledge exchange sites, such as LinkedIn and Flickr, where users share a 
greater amount of personal information in order to maximise networking opportunities, are associated 
with higher levels of victimisation (Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard, & Tennakoon, 2015).
Alternative considerations of persuasive techniques have examined the influence of authority. Gué-
guen and Jacob (2002) again used a simulated phishing attack, targeting users who signed on to network 
computers in a university building being monitored by the researchers. Participants were either sent an 
email from a low-status individual (another student) or a professor from the university, deemed to be of 
a higher authoritative status, with results demonstrating greater response likelihood for the email sent 
from the high-authority figure. These findings are in line with theoretical perspectives on the psychology 
of persuasion, outlining the influence of factors such as authority, social proof, and scarcity (Cialdini, 
1993). This example is similar to whaling attacks, a type of phishing outlined earlier in the chapter, in 
which the fraudster sends an email from the hacked or imitated account of a senior executive within an 
organisation, to induce a response through a purported authoritative identity. Such persuasive factors are 
thought to lead users to overlook cues that would otherwise have indicated the illegitimacy of an email 
(Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). Further support for this notion comes from Freiermuth (2011), who’s 
analysis of email content demonstrated the presence of a number of mechanisms intended to invoke 
a response from the recipient. This research emphasises consistently used techniques in Nigerian 419 
scams, such as building resonance with the scammer, offering rewards, and emulating a sense of urgency.
Additional contextual factors may lead to similar oversights in terms of the cues available within an 
email, for example when users are distracted or overly concerned with other tasks. Yan and Gozu (2012) 
demonstrated this when they asked participants to make email legitimacy judgments either as quickly as 
possible, or to take their time over decisions. When participants spent longer assessing the emails they 
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demonstrated lower susceptibility. Further to this, Jones (2016) demonstrated that when participants 
were asked to complete a secondary verbal task (counting backwards aloud) simultaneously with an 
email legitimacy task, their accuracy was lower than a control and a secondary motor task condition. 
This study intended to emulate a scenario where users are multi-tasking whilst managing emails, typical 
of a daily office scenario, such as talking on the phone with a colleague or client.
An alternative, or complimentary, approach to understanding response behaviour considers whether 
individual differences between users may make some more susceptible than others (Williams, Beardmore, 
& Joinson, 2017). Factors that indicate a reliance on intuitive responses have been shown to increase 
susceptibility to fraud, such as self-control (Holtfreter, Reisig, Piquero, & Piquero, 2010), cognitive 
reflection, and inhibition (Jones et al., submitted). The influence of cognitive reflection was replicated 
across email legitimacy tasks, as well as an office simulation task in which participants were naïve to 
the true nature of the research (Jones, 2016), supporting the validity of this finding.
It is possible that there is a crossover between these different explanations of susceptibility, for 
example, users may be more inclined to rely on intuitive decision-making, thus demonstrating higher 
susceptibility in certain scenarios and in response to certain persuasive techniques that are employed. 
At this point though, this is an area that requires further exploration.
All of the insights highlighted here are currently limited by the unknown validity of the measures 
taken to assess susceptibility. It is therefore important that on-going work considers the development of 
an assessment tool and method that allows for control of factors being measured, whilst also ensuring 
maximum possible validity in measuring real world susceptibility. Below, the authors describe some 
potential directions that could unify approaches taken across industry and academic research in an at-
tempt to reach this goal.
BUILDING A UNITED FRONT
Research gathered under controlled conditions in a lab setting provides valuable knowledge on how 
specified factors can influence perceptions of phishing emails. However, the methodologies employed 
in these settings mean that it is hard to know to what extent these factors relate to real world response 
behaviour and susceptibility. Ultimately – just because an influencing factor is significant in the lab 
doesn’t mean that it is having the same effect in the real world.
Practical and ethical constraints in research make it difficult to assess susceptibility in a naturalistic 
environment. By enhancing collaborations between industry and academia, we will be one step closer 
to understanding how user decisions are influenced in the real world. Whilst industry approaches focus 
on appraising the vulnerability within an organisation, highlighting potential threats and identifying 
users that are more likely to respond, academic approaches take a more in depth look at why certain 
users respond whilst others do not. Ultimately, the combination of these approaches can allow for the 
development of novel techniques and effective training mechanisms to reduce susceptibility.
Psychological research has much to offer in addressing methodological and validity concerns associ-
ated with lab-based studies, but there are a number of inconsistencies still to be ironed out. For example, 
across a series of studies conducted by the authors, cognitive and situational influences were assessed 
through both an explicit judgment task, and an office simulation where email responses were monitored 
92
Examinations of Email Fraud Susceptibility
 
without participants being aware of the study purpose (Jones, 2016). Results were partially replicated 
across these, demonstrating the influence of cognitive reflection. However, a number of factors (e.g. 
inhibition, time pressure) were not replicated, bringing into question the alignment of the two methodolo-
gies in terms of how well they are assessing susceptibility. Without further investigation, it is difficult 
to establish which methodology provides a better representation of real world response behaviour, and 
as such which influential factors should be acted upon.
One of the potential ways in which research can be harnessed to interact more closely with real-world 
security concerns is to focus on the development of risk mitigation strategies that incorporate research 
insights on user behaviour. At the present time, as discussed, behavioural models of fraud vulnerability 
are not well developed. For this reason, a lot of the training currently available focuses on issues such 
as improving the ability to differentiate between genuine and fraudulent web sites and images, based on 
generic visual cues (Moreno-Fernandez, Blanco, Garaizar, & Malute, 2017). Whilst there is no evidence 
for or against the effectiveness of such training mechanisms in an organisational setting, some empirical 
research has demonstrated that priming (Jones, 2016; Junger, Montoya, & Overink, 2017) and knowl-
edge of basic security cues (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006) alone is not enough to reduce response 
likelihood to phishing emails. Even if an improvement were seen shortly after training on these cues, 
the saliency of these in an actual phishing email during a moment of regular day-to-day behaviour is 
unlikely to replicate this. Bullée, Montoya Morales, Junger, and Hartel (2016) examined the effective-
ness of priming in relation to telephone-based social engineering attacks. Although an improvement in 
detection was seen one week after the intervention, this effect was lost when participants were tested 
again two weeks later, and in fact susceptibility was shown to increase.
The increasing sophistication of phishing emails means that generic visual cues that users are told to 
look out for, such as spelling mistakes and fake email addresses (as seen on the Citizen’s Advice Bureau 
website, 2016), are often irrelevant in many cases. The more generic phishing emails are often picked 
up by spam filters these days, and so focus needs to be drawn to the more advanced emails designed to 
trick even the most security conscious user.
By understanding the factors that influence susceptibility, training programmes could be tailored to 
educate users about these, and to target the most susceptible individuals within an organisation, as part 
of a broader cyber risk mitigation programme. Therefore, the authors would advocate a gradual transition 
towards more empirically grounded and theoretically inspired training techniques, which can draw from 
a greater body of research knowledge in the design of interventions. Moreover, the authors emphasise 
the importance of assessing the effectiveness of these training methods over multiple time scales and 
contexts. The continued advancement in the techniques used by fraudsters means that training methods 
must do more than tell users what cues to look out for. Training programmes must be designed to transi-
tion alongside these changes in order to maintain their effectiveness. At the most advanced level, this may 
mean training users to understand the underlying mechanisms and motivations behind the development 
of phishing emails, to help users see through the malicious intentions of a sender when they are reading 
emails. But at its most basic level, this might simply mean that training programmes are kept as up to 
date as possible with the most sophisticated techniques and persuasive mechanisms used to manipulate 
the user. In line with current trends in social engineering attacks, one example might be to incorporate 
advice and information about the unseen harm on both a personal and an organisational level that can 
result from an employee posting information publicly on social media.
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CONCLUSION
As outlined here, it is clear that there are differences in the approaches taken to tackling email fraud 
between industry and academia, although both are working towards the same goal of tackling the threat 
posed by email fraud. Whilst industry is concerned with managing risk to protect valuable assets, with 
immediate solutions to address the issue and prevent future financial loss for organisations, academic 
research is more focused on understanding the theoretical principles underlying response behaviour in 
order to develop long-term solutions. Although the process may be more drawn out, given the unknowns 
that require examination, this more in-depth understanding will benefit all invested parties in the future. 
For solutions to have an on-going impact on secure behaviour, these must ensure users are able to tran-
sition their knowledge in line with the development and increased sophistication of phishing attacks.
There are clear parallels between these two approaches, both of which have advantages and disad-
vantages in terms of the methods currently employed. Collaborations between industry and academia 
are becoming more common, and the authors believe that further progression in this direction can only 
benefit on-going efforts to build a united front against persistent cyber security threats. Whilst industry 
offers access to a real-world sample that can be studied in a naturalistic environment, academia works 
towards the most ethical and theoretically grounded methods to harness the potential from this. It is 
hoped that consideration of industry impact will help academic researchers orient their research to elicit 
maximum benefit for industry partners, whilst also demonstrating to industry the importance of con-
sidering the impact human decision-making can have on cyber security. The transition within research 
settings to use more naturalistic assessments of email response behaviour will allow for the development 
of more effective training solutions that are relevant to real world behaviour, have a long-term effect on 
susceptibility, and as such can decrease the risk of victimisation for organisations and individual users.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Collaboration: Bringing together alternative approaches and perspectives to develop novel ideas 
and solutions.
Email Fraud: The use of email as a means of deceiving users for personal or financial gain.
Individual Differences: Variations in human behaviour as a result of a specific trait or traits.
Informed Consent: The participant agrees to participate in research, with a full understanding of 
the research purpose and tasks involved.
Penetration Testing: Assessment of vulnerabilities within an organisation’s computer system or 
network, including human users.
Persuasive Techniques: Factors that can be manipulated to influence human behaviour.
Susceptibility: A likelihood to be more easily affected or influenced by a specific thing.
